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ABSTRACT: Set against tendencies in the Renaissance and later political theory to 
see Cicero in tension with Aristotle, this research essay reports the results of a close study 
of all of Cicero’s texts that bear on his reading, understanding and assessment of Aristotle 
and the Peripatetic school. The essay necessarily attends to Cicero’s sources for his encoun-
ter with Aristotle and affirms, with some qualifications, Cicero’s overall continuity with 
the moral and political thought of Aristotle.
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[M]y philosophical writings differing very little from Peri-
patetic teachings, for both i and those men wish to follow 
in the socratic and Platonic tradition… (cicero, De Officiis 
i. 2)
cicero was rome’s “best Aristotelian”. (dante)1
The authority of the American declaration of independen-
ce rests in part on its drawing from “elementary books of 
public right as Aristotle, cicero, locke, sidney, etc.” (Tho-
mas Jefferson, 1824/1973. 12)
This research essay provides the basis, in cicero’s own writings, to see his moral 
and political thinking as a significant roman manifestation of political Aristo-
telianism. it examines closely his assessment of Aristotle’s political legacy and 
the necessary preliminary topic of cicero’s sources for understanding Aristotle 
1  This was dante’s judgement according to A. e. douglas (1965, 162) and Paul renucci 
(1954, 331). A seemingly different claim made by the 20th century scholar ernest fortin (1996, 
33) was that cicero and Varro are “Plato’s roman disciples.”
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and the teachings of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle. The essay thus 
lays important groundwork for more focused comparative examinations of such 
topics as equality, democracy, mixed government, human rights and natural law. 
since cicero’s selective but substantial appropriation of Aristotle’s practical phi-
losophy to his thinking entails a commentary on it, his own moral and political 
philosophy illuminates not only some of the possible features but also some of 
the difficulties and challenges for a modern Aristotelian public philosophy.
The TrAdiTion of oPPosinG ArisToTle And cicero
following dante and indeed cicero himself and thus seeing cicero largely in 
continuity with Aristotle, requires, at the very least, some notice of those who 
have thought otherwise. There is a “modern” tradition that emphasizes the op-
position and tension between cicero and Aristotle. Manifestations of this appear 
at least as far back as the early renaissance. here it is possible only to give a 
sketch and small sampling of the arguments and concerns of this tradition. it 
is well to have such arguments and concerns in mind as this essay proceeds to 
examine the texts of cicero. 
The more recent manifestation of this tradition and the form of it that has 
had a direct impact on the study of political theory in the past century is that 
most often traced to the carlyles’ opening chapter on cicero in their six-volume 
work entitled A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West.2 They argue that 
“the dividing-line between the ancient and the modern political theory” occurs 
in the period between Aristotle and cicero and is signaled by the “change … 
startling in its completeness” between Aristotle’s “view of the natural inequal-
ity of human nature” and cicero’s opposing view. in cicero’s and later roman 
thought they see “the beginnings of a theory of human nature and society of 
which the `liberty, equality, and fraternity’ of the french revolution is only 
the present-day expression.”3 cicero is seen as seminal to and largely in accord 
with the liberal thinking of modernity, and his frequent antithesis in these por-
trayals, Aristotle, is consigned to a quite alien and justly irrelevant past.4 
2  r.W. carlyle and A.J. carlyle (1903). cicero’s position in this larger work dramatizes the 
carlyles’ view that cicero’s political thought marks an important turn, to be further devel-
oped via mediaeval political theory, toward the egalitarian and popular foundations of modern 
political thinking.
3  carlyle & carlyle (1903, i, 8–9). following in this vein of seeing a fundamental divide 
between Aristotle and cicero are Mcilwain 1932, 1947, sabine 1960, cumming 1969, Mccoy 
1950, 1963. The latter three are not as focused on equality as are the carlyles and Mcilwain 
in seeing this as the single fundamental difference.
4  All of those writers here associated with the carlyles’ “great divide” thesis do acknowl-
edge various continuities between cicero’s and Aristotle’s thought. in the case of the car-
lyles’ own work, even as they focus on cicero as a champion of human equality they notice 
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This embrace of cicero at the expense of Aristotle runs more deeply in mo-
dernity than the formative analysis by the carlyles at the turn into the last cen-
tury. in 1706, at the very beginning of what has been not unfittingly called “a 
ciceronian century” (Wood 1988, 3), Jean Barbeyrac published An Historical 
and Critical Account of the Science of Morality which initially in french and then 
later in english translation (1749) appeared as a preface to Pufendorf’s The Law 
of Nature and Nations. richard Tuck, my source for the account of Barbeyrac’s 
work, reports his view that among ancient philosophers “only the stoics had 
come anywhere near to giving an adequate account of man’s moral life” (1979, 
174–75). “…[W]ithout dispute, the best Treatise of Morality, that all Antiquity 
has produc’d” claimed Barbeyrac, is cicero’s De Officiis. As for Aristotle, Bar-
beyrac saw his influence as a moral teacher ever ascendant after the fall of rome 
and lamented this, for from Aristotle came “scholastic Philosophy; which … 
with its barbarous cant, became even more prejudicial to religion and Moral-
ity, than to the speculative sciences” and produced an ethics which “is a Piece 
of Patchwork; a confus’d collection, without any order, or fix’d Principles … .” 
At the root of what unfolded in Western history was, according to Barbeyrac, 
Aristotle’s failure to grasp “just ideas of the natural equality of Mankind; and, 
by some of his expressions, he gives occasion to believe, that he thought some 
Men to be, by nature, design’d for slaves … . Thus this vast Genius of nature, 
this Philosopher, for whom such numbers have so great a Veneration, proves 
to be grosly (sic) ignorant of, and, without any scruple, treads under foot, one 
of the most evident Principles of the law of nature”. Barbeyrac’s work shows 
then not only a modern ancestry for the carlyle’s thesis of the “great divide” but 
also an emphasis on the way human equality is treated as the significant point 
at issue in the divide. The carlyles’ and Barbeyrac’s understanding of what is at 
issue in the “divide”, with varying emphases in one or another expression of this 
position, sees Aristotle as viewing man as never simply equal and in his place in 
a structured polis which has nourished and educated him; cicero is found em-
phasizing man as an individual, substantially if not simply equal to others, with 
whom he stands in a universal human community under nature and equipped to 
read nature with reason to provide self-direction. The making of such a division 
between Aristotle and cicero obviously involves interpretations of Aristotle as 
passages where they find him “speaking under the influence partly at least of the Aristotelian 
principle of the fundamental distinction in human nature; [they] find him thinking of man-
kind as capable of being divided into those who are able to govern themselves and those who 
are not” (12). Adding that these passages do not change their overall view, they see these 
passages being in contradiction to that view and take refuge in cicero’s alleged weakness as 
a philosopher: “it must be remembered that cicero’s eclecticism is in part the expression of 
a certain incoherence in his philosophical conceptions, and that it is not a matter for any great 
surprise that we should find him holding together opinions hardly capable of reconciliation.”
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well as of cicero’s texts; in what will follow later, we proceed only from the side 
of cicero. 
first, however, there is need to look to the second form of the “modern” tra-
dition of opposition and to bring out the nature of the differences between Aris-
totle and cicero as found in this approach. This form of opposing Aristotle and 
cicero goes more deeply into our past than the strain which we have just found 
as far back as Barbeyrac at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Though 
apparently beginning in the renaissance and humanist enthusiasm for cicero, 
the outcome of this way of opposing “the philosopher” and “the orator” works 
in time to elevate Aristotle in a manner that significantly diminishes the philo-
sophical weight of cicero. This form of the tradition seems then to be rooted 
both in the renaissance enthusiasm for cicero over Aristotle and in the coun-
terattack of Aristotelians that, later joining with the concern for a comprehensive 
and scientific knowledge that emerges in the post-Baconian period, appears to 
have been largely successful.5 
The conflict between Aristotelians and ciceronians as the renaissance 
dawned is signaled by observations like that of Jerrold seigel that in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries cicero became among humanists, “the object of 
the kind of enthusiasm” directed earlier at Aristotle (1968, 30). The new enthusi-
asm for cicero should not, however, invite generalizations that oversimplify and 
too sharply differentiate the renaissance as ciceronian and the Medieval period 
as Aristotelian, or that consider cicero as first really embraced and properly un-
derstood in the renaissance. earlier in a similar vein in his Cicero Scepticus, c. P. 
schmitt wrote (1972, 33) that “cicero’s influence during the Middle Ages was 
enormous … . perhaps as great as Aristotle’s”. And on the renaissance side of 
this divide, there is, of course, a vigorous Aristotelianism that manifests itself, in 
one way, in what seem to me sound efforts to emphasize the essential harmony 
between cicero and Aristotle at least in moral philosophy and specifically with 
respect to rhetoric’s moral status.6 Though the concepts of Aristotelianism and 
ciceronianism, just as the much attacked concepts of the renaissance and Mid-
dle Ages, do tend to sharpen artificially and thus falsely actual differences (not to 
speak of how they might contribute to polarizing our conceptions of Aristotle’s 
and cicero’s thought), these concepts and the conflict they are used to describe 
in this case are hardly mere constructs of intellectual historians. My purpose 
5  cicero’s philosophical ability and significance first comes under attack in the course of 
the controversy between ciceronians and Aristotelians in the renaissance. Before that, there 
is pervasive respect, if not acclaim, for him as a philosopher though there is a tradition, to 
which Augustine chiefly gives birth, of differentiating cicero’s thought from the fullness of 
truth and genuine wisdom that is possible in the light of christian revelation.
6  see especially seigel 1968, chap. iV, and 1966, 38–39. see also Tuck 1979, 44–45, 176. 
Tuck emphasizes at several points that the renaissance Aristotle is not invariably the Aristo-
tle of the scholastics.
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here, of course, is not to detail the development of this conflict or describe fully 
its many varieties and complexities. My knowledge of the conflict is dependent 
on the work of other scholars supplemented by my study of a substantial por-
tion of Petrarch’s writings.7 it is Petrarch, that great ciceronian enthusiast of the 
early renaissance, whom i primarily utilize in an effort to state what is at issue 
in this form of the tradition of opposition. 
Petrarch’s writings provide considerable material not only on what he thought 
distinguished cicero’s thought but also on the nature of the Aristotelian attack 
on his ciceronianism and his response to it. Petrarch is direct and unqualified in 
making clear that his initial attraction to cicero was based on his eloquence, that 
this dimension of cicero remains critically important for him, and that the lead-
ing edge of the Aristotelian attack echoes an old charge against cicero, namely 
“much eloquence but little wisdom”. Thus cicero’s rhetorical achievement and 
notable concern with rhetoric seem for the Aristotelians a badge of his philo-
sophical inferiority. The chief issue in the conflict, as it emerges in Petrarch’s 
writings, is then a ciceronian esteem for eloquence and rhetoric versus an Aris-
totelian “despising” of it, or at the least holding it suspect (1948b, 53–54, 61–62, 
85, 87, 91). 
To state the conflict, however, in terms of cicero the orator versus Aristotle 
the philosopher would concede to the Aristotelians the definition of the issue 
and does not represent the view of Petrarch and no doubt other ciceronians. 
rather, eloquence is related to a certain conception of philosophy in which cic-
ero is seen to excel.8 This is philosophy characterized by a moral focus and hav-
ing the actual practice of virtue, the living of the good human life, for its end.9 
for Petrarch, cicero’s eloquence is a part of his wisdom; rhetoric is seen to be, 
and properly so, in the service of wisdom and philosophy.10 Petrarch finds the 
broad and pure learning of the Aristotelians aimless and needlessly contentious 
7  schmitt 1972, for example, describes some of the vigorous conflict in the renaissance 
between those who proclaimed themselves Aristotelians and those who followed cicero; see 
79 ff. and especially his discussion of Pierre Galland (1510–59), 98 ff.
8  A defense of cicero in this respect, inclusive of a finding that he is essentially consistent 
with Aristotle, is found in Garsten 2006. Bird 1976 and Kimball 1986 accentuate the differ-
ence between the rhetorical (oratorical) strain and the philosophical one in the Western tradi-
tion of the humanities.
9  Petrarch 1948b, 61–62, 103, 105. Also, seigel 1968, 34–35 where he cites Petrarch in On 
the Remedies of Both Kinds of Fortune invoking cicero and writing that the way to eloquence is 
found in giving “your attention first of all to virtue and wisdom.”
10  seigel is on the mark when he appreciates Petrarch’s reading of cicero, writing that 
“Petrarch’s intelligence penetrated deeply into the structure of cicero’s mental world” (1968, 
33; also 60, 224, 259). however, seigel’s conclusion on cicero’s understanding of the relation 
of rhetoric and philosophy undermines cicero’s significance as a philosopher: The ciceronian 
combination of rhetoric and philosophy was complex and intricate. As a philosophical posi-
tion it was weak and inconsistent, but it was also humane. it allowed the intellectual to waver 
between a position based on the standards of thought and one based on those of action (1968, 
15, 26, 29).
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(1948b, 56, 77; 1948a, 137). furthermore, he contrasts cicero’s Academic skepti-
cism and its humility with the arrogant assurance and argument from authority 
manifested by some Aristotelians and sees the latter as a threat to a genuine 
philosophical spirit.11 
especially on this last point, Petrarch makes clear, as did other critics of the 
Aristotelians, that his differences are with the latin-using Aristotelians rather 
than with Aristotle.12 he cites (1948b, 53–54, 102) indications in cicero and 
other sources that Aristotle was himself eloquent and more favorable to rhetoric 
than those marching under Aristotle’s banner in Petrarch’s own time. Although 
he does find that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics lacks the sting to virtuous action 
which he finds in cicero’s writings and in that respect it is inferior, he concedes 
greater “acumen” to the analysis of Aristotle.13 for Petrarch the issue is between 
a cicero whose texts he knows well and the practices of the Aristotelians. one 
might say it is between two differing conceptions of philosophy, but for Petrarch 
such a portrayal would be too gentle and insufficiently precise; for him cicero 
represents genuine philosophy in the socratic-Platonic tradition, the Aristoteli-
ans often manifest a muddled, arrogant and false philosophy that is not a legiti-
mate offspring of Aristotle’s own thought and writings. 
That distinctive conception of philosophy that Petrarch finds in cicero seems 
thereafter to ever lose ground as a way of knowing or science in the Western 
tradition. The ideal of a comprehensive and assured knowledge that appears 
in the Aristotelians merges much more readily with the emerging and subse-
quent enlightenment aspiration to a comprehensive science. The anomaly with 
which we are faced regarding comparisons of cicero and Aristotle comes into 
focus in that ciceronian eighteenth century, for then cicero is heralded (as in 
Barbeyrac and later in the carlyles) as a moral thinker and a “modern” even 
as his stature as a philosopher suffers. one can see in the dual view of cicero 
the Kantian problematic at the heart of that century: new and sure foundations 
neither Petrarch nor cicero would have appreciated a severance of the standards of action 
from those of thought. nor is the positivism – rhetoric and law seen as distinct from reason and 
nature – that Tuck 1979, 33 ff., 44–45 traces in the renaissance Petrarchan or ciceronian.
11  1948b, 124–25; also, 1948c, 34–35. in On Familiar Matters 3. 6 (1975, 128–29), Petrarch 
seems an exemplary ciceronian Academic skeptic as he adopts a stoic position on what con-
stitutes happiness and points to cicero’s De Finibus for a fuller treatment of the matter. not-
ing the teachings of various ancient philosophical schools, Petrarch tells his correspondent 
that “the authority of philosophers does not prevent freedom of judgment” and that he is 
here providing “not the truth of the matter (for that perhaps is hidden) but how it appeared 
to me.”
12  1948b, 74, 107. schmitt (1972, 91) notes a general tendency among humanists in the 
fourteenth through sixteenth centuries to find Aristotle’s actual writings quite acceptable and 
to focus their protests against pollutions of his teachings which were seen in “scholastic ver-
sions and interpretations of Aristotle.” 
13  see his exchange with Jean de hesdin, a french calomniateur of cicero, in de nolhac, 
1907, and also,1948b, 102–03.
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of comprehensive science are to be set down, and at the same time in another 
sphere, where cicero and the stoics are given a strong voice, the moral life is to 
be nourished. The nature of the modern tradition of seeing opposition between 
cicero and Aristotle and what is at stake in it has now been sketched. The re-
examination of this complex tradition properly begins with a return to the texts 
of cicero and Aristotle; in this case, a first step, attended to here, is looking to 
cicero on Aristotle.
sources for cicero’s ArisToTle
one is required to ask, at the very beginning, whether cicero knew the same 
Aristotle whom the renaissance knew and we can know today.14 does he have 
access to essentially the same corpus of Aristotle’s works which later, through 
the first century B. c. edition of Andronicus of rhodes, provided the Aristote-
lian canon for the future? The perhaps surprising answer is that cicero had more 
of Aristotle’s work available to him than we do and than most people have had 
both before and after his lifetime. cicero lived at the very juncture in time and 
even in place when and where the new Aristotelian corpus of Andronicus was 
put together and made available and the hitherto known popular or exoteric 
writings of Aristotle begin their disappearance which has resulted in their all 
but complete loss.15 one would expect, given cicero’s sustained interest in phi-
14  in the larger context in which this paper is set, namely, that just reviewed, that of later 
comparisons of cicero and Aristotle and contentions between ciceronians and Aristotelians, 
it is also appropriate to ask whether we twenty-first century political theorists know the same 
cicero whom the renaissance did. With the exception of cicero’s De Re Publica (Rep.), lost it 
appears sometime shortly after Augustine wrote and recovered with significant lacunae early in 
the nineteenth century, the same texts of cicero are available at both times. chiefly through 
Augustine and Macrobius’s fourth century Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, the Middle Ages 
and renaissance had some knowledge of the nature of Rep. The “great divide” thesis of the 
carlyles does not seem dependent on the Rep. in particular; note above that Barbeyrac’s ver-
sion of the thesis is early eighteenth century. it is not a new and different cicero revealed in 
Rep. Given cicero’s embrace of the mixed regime in Rep. and his related Platonic-inspired 
critique of democracy, one wonders how the alleged egalitarianism of cicero could play such 
a defining role for those who would see him as essentially “modern.”
15  The story of both the puzzle of the disappearance of Aristotle’s popular writings after 
the Andronicus edition of cicero’s lifetime and the development of that edition at rome, 
with the hand of cicero likely involved, is told succinctly in Masters, 1977, 31–33. see also 
M. frede 1999, 773–75, 784 who thinks the Andronican edition may have been completed 
before cicero’s life and that it had considerable impact on other schools of philosophy and the 
Aristotelian revival cicero encountered. see also Gottschalk 1987, 1095 for a summary view 
of the various placements of the Andronican edition. for materials indicating the evidence of 
various lost works of Aristotle in the texts of cicero, see MacKendrick, 1989, 9, n. 38 on 319. 
since Masters’ and other earlier work, there has been a significant but largely reaffirming ef-
fort by david sedley and especially by Jonathan Barnes to examine the presence of Aristotle 
and Aristotelianism in the period of hellenistic philosophy and to speculate further on the 
timing and significance of the edition of Andronicus. sedley (1989, 118) has observed, “it 
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losophy throughout his life, his specific concern to introduce Greek philosophy 
to rome and his evident interaction with other learned romans, that he would 
be aware of, if not in close contact with, the enterprise of assembling the new 
and true Aristotle that has just occurred or was occurring right in rome during 
the very years of his adult life. his writings support this expectation and at the 
least indicate that he consulted the non-popular works (commentarios) of Aristo-
tle then being recovered and assembled.16 in the reference to these works at De 
Finibus v. 12, cicero actually uses the Greek cognate (ἐξωτερικόν) for “exo-
teric” to describe the popular works which are contrasted with those (limatius) 
“more carefully composed” commentarii, usually translated as “notebooks”.17 in 
this passage, cicero reveals that the distinction between the exoteric works and 
has always been a struggle for modern scholars to accept how extraordinarily little notice the 
hellenistic philosophers apparently took of Aristotle, in view of his immense importance to 
the subsequent history of philosophy.” sedley sees Aristotelianism being resurrected in and 
just before cicero’s time by means of taking Aristotle and his school to be part of the Platonic 
revival and the synthesis of Antiochus. lynch (1972, 204) concluded that cicero’s knowledge 
of Aristotle came largely through Antiochus. Barnes (1989, 1997) is in essential agreement and 
believes there was much Aristotle available to cicero even if it is likely that the Andronican 
edition was first put together after cicero’s death.
16  De Finibus (Fin.) iii. 10; v. 12. There is nothing in cicero’s writings to indicate that he 
did not read what he could of the new Aristotle with care. At present i am not convinced that 
cicero has the Aristotle we know wrong in some significant way. As early as 55 B. c. during 
a time when other letters indicate cicero is reading Aristotle, cicero writes Atticus (Epistulae 
ad Atticum [Ep. Att.] iv. 10) that he “is being sustained by the library of faustus” at cumae, a 
library thought to contain the esoteric writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus. see d. frede, 
1989, 95, n. 18. Glucker (1978, 223) saw one impact of the rediscovery of Aristotle’s texts be-
ing was that those turning to the texts were becoming Aristotelians rather than Peripatetics. 
otherwise before and no doubt somewhat into the last generation of the republic, it would 
have been unusual to describe oneself as an Aristotelian rather than a Peripatetic. While con-
ceding that cicero could “have discovered all the Andronican Aristotle”, earl (1972, 850ff., 
853) raises doubts about the presence of the Aristotle manuscripts in the library at cumae and 
cicero’s knowledge of the new Aristotle, A similar conclusion regarding cicero’s knowledge 
of “the mature Aristotle” was reached earlier, though without much argument, in how, (1930, 
27). Powell (1995, 18) emphasizes the different views on the extent of cicero’s knowledge 
of the Andronican Aristotle while claiming that cicero had a good knowledge of Aristotle’s 
published writings including, it seems, the esoteric works brought to rome in 84 by sulla; 
long (1995, 42–43 and n. 11) urges readers to keep an open mind on the question even as he 
inclines against thinking cicero knew much of our Aristotle. 
regarding Aristotle’s “scientific work”, harris (1961, 10) claims their study was abandoned 
by the Peripatetics of cicero’s time who were “imbued with the spirit of stoicism.” it seems, 
however, in the light of cicero’s references to Aristotle’s and the Peripatetic teaching in Fin. 
v and Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc.) i, that cicero had some contact with the scientific side of 
the Peripatetic tradition. sedley (1980, 5) has taken a different turn on this matter. in writing 
of the comparative weakness of the Peripatetic school in the hellenistic period (noting inter 
alia the loss of Aristotle’s library upon the death of Theophrastus), he remarks “however 
the philosophical writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus were certainly available to any hel-
lenistic philosopher sufficiently interested to seek them out, and their influence should not 
be discounted. it is apparent above all in hellenistic physics and cosmology, and to a lesser 
extent in ethics, though surprisingly little in logic.”
17  cicero also uses the Greek term to describe this set of Aristotle’s writings in Ep. Att. iv. 16.
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the notebooks is one which the Peripatetics themselves make,18 that it is a dis-
tinction which applies to various works of the school, not simply to Aristotle’s 
writings, and that he is sufficiently familiar with both the exoteric writings and 
the notebooks to comment on the appearance of inconsistency between them 
with respect to content.
cicero did not, it seems, know with assurance that our Nicomachean Ethics 
and Politics were works of Aristotle. cicero cites neither of these works directly, 
though he mentions the Nicomachean Ethics and shows himself aware that this 
work is attributed to Aristotle; he himself is inclined to think it was authored 
by Aristotle’s son nicomachus.19 Though the scholarly consensus is that cicero 
did not know our Politics, there is a possibility, as the late elizabeth rawson 
suggests, that he knew the Politics or much of it as the work of Theophrastus, 
Aristotle’s successor as head of the Peripatetic school.20 Whether or not cicero 
did give close attention to the texts of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics or en-
countered their teachings in other sources, his work shows the impact of such 
teachings and appears largely consistent with them. The teaching of the Ethics 
is quite clearly reflected in De Finibus, especially in Book ii where cicero speaks 
in his own persona, and the De Finibus is a book that cicero regards as his most 
important and that treats the topic which he holds to be foundational to all phi-
losophy.21 Quite directly cicero associates what he does in De Re Publica and De 
Legibus with the tradition of political inquiry in which Aristotle and his school are 
18  The use of the term “exoteric” to describe his other works has been found within our 
Aristotle of Andronicus; see Masters, 1977, 32, 49 & n. 2. earlier these usages had been dis-
cussed by Jaeger 1948, 32ff. who brought a skeptical spirit to all such references. Aulus Gel-
lius (20.5) reported that Aristotle used to give rigorous courses for specialists in the morning 
and more popular ones in the afternoon, Gottschalk 1987, 1172–73.
19  Fin. v. 12. cicero’s suggestion of authorship is firmly rejected by Jaeger, 1948, 230. 
Barnes (1997, 58, 64) thinks it likely that nicomachus was editor of one set of Aristotle’s ethi-
cal writings, and eudemus editor of another set.
20  d. frede (1989, 81) reports this scholarly consensus and makes a set of supportive ar-
guments, which i do not find compelling, based on a comparison of certain teachings of the 
Politics with cicero’s, primarily as found in De re publica. The consensus is reflected in the “in-
troduction” to laks & schofield 1995, 2. ferrary (1995, 54) doubts that cicero had any direct 
acquaintance with the Politics, and while noting his encounter with Aristotelianism through 
what Annas calls, later in the same volume, “hybrid” theories like those of Antiochus and Pa-
naetius, he emphasizes, as does this paper in what follows, the significance of Theophrastus 
as a source for cicero. in the essay that follows, Annas focuses on Antiochus and Arius didy-
mus as evident carriers of Aristotelian thinking. in an interesting, related observation, hardly 
irrelevant to cicero’s thinking, Annas remarks that the modification of Aristotelian ideas to 
meet stoic objections is one of the most important developments in hellenistic philosophical 
debates (74, n. 3). for rawson’s suggestion, see rawson, 1985, 290. The reader of the Politics 
will find some support for her suggestion in the way cicero describes a political writing of 
Theophrastus at Fin. v. 11. note Masters’ hypothesis (1977, 36–41) that Andronicus has com-
bined lectures of Theophrastus and some of Aristotle in our edition of the Politics. see recent 
support for a hypothesis like this and for the likely impact of Theophrastus on the work of 
cicero in d. frede, 1989, 86, 88, 94.
21  Fin. i. 11; De Divinatione (Div.) ii. 2.
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perceived as distinguishing themselves.22 could not the Politics or some version 
of it be what cicero has in mind when he so credits the Peripatetic heritage in 
political philosophy?
There are no doubts, however, about cicero’s considerable knowledge and 
use of Aristotle’s exoteric works as well as the writings of other Peripatetics. 
in fact, those exoteric works, which apparently were chiefly in the form of dia-
logues, are partly known to us through fragments and paraphrases preserved in 
the writings of cicero. Among the exoteric works that seem to be particularly 
influential on cicero is an exhortation to philosophy known as the Protrepti-
cus which seems to have impacted on cicero’s Hortensius, limited though our 
knowledge of that work is.23 The Protrepticus appears to have considered the 
relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. for his understanding of Aristo-
tle, cicero cites and apparently relies heavily on a work titled On Philosophy, also 
among the lost exoteric writings. regarding Aristotle’s political teaching in the 
exoterica, two dialogues – on justice and on the statesman – are thought to have 
been cicero’s primary sources.24 it seems likely that it is these which he has in 
mind when in october 54 he writes his brother about his efforts in composing 
De Re Publica and mentions Aristotle’s writings “concerning the polity and the 
statesman” (de republica et praestante viro).25 later as he reviews his philosophical 
works in his prologue to Book ii of De Divinatione, cicero adds but one comment 
(Div. ii. 3) when mentioning his De Re Publica, namely, that it concerns “an im-
portant topic, appropriate to philosophy, and a topic very fully treated (tractatus 
uberrime) by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire Peripatetic school”.
These indications that cicero associates his political philosophy with a Peri-
patetic heritage are supported by his fuller comments in his own persona in the 
De Finibus where he reports that “the topic of civic life (which the Greeks call 
political) was treated authoritatively and fully (graviter et copiose)” by the early 
Peripatetics and Academics who had no important disagreement between them-
22  De Legibus (Leg.) iii. 13–14, a passage where cicero indicates that much of his material 
both in Rep. and in Leg. comes from the wing of the Academy developed by Aristotle and 
Theophrastus.
23  Jaeger, 1948, 55, 65 ff. Anton-hermann chroust (1964) is one of the scholars who has 
sought to reconstruct the Protrepticus from fragments and passages found here and there, in-
cluding some from cicero’s texts.
24  how, 1930, 27. ferrary (1995, 62, n. 30), here following Moraux, attributes an aspect of 
cicero’s political theory to the dialogue on justice. Another work of Aristotle’s which there is 
clear evidence cicero had in hand and read is “Aristotle’s books to Alexander”; see Ep. Att. 
xii. 40. This appears to be the work that was alternatively titled On Colonization, and Jaeger 
contends (1948, 24, 259) that if we had the work it would provide considerable insight into 
Aristotle’s later political thought.
25  Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem (Ep. Q.) iii. 5–6. 1–2. see Powell’s (1994, 23) strong sense 
that cicero is looking to Aristotle regarding the concept of a “first citizen” or statesman.
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selves.26 When he refers to “the early Peripatetics”, cicero seems to have in 
mind the work of Aristotle, presumably his exoteric dialogues on justice and the 
statesman, and that of Theophrastus. What cicero has in mind, though, might 
well include treatises that later came to be part of Andronicus’s version of the 
Politics. however that may be, in what immediately follows in this passage there 
is an indication that cicero saw the Peripatetic branch of the Academy as the 
major voice in political philosophy and a voice that spoke quite directly to his 
own program of writings. he exclaims, “how much those men have written on 
the polity (de republica), how much on laws (de legibus)! how much about the art 
of rhetoric and how many examples of speaking well have they left for us!”27 
A few lines later (Fin. iv. 6) he enumerates some of the specific topics they have 
treated, listing “on justice, on moderation, on courage, on friendship, on the 
conduct of life, on philosophy and on statesmanship”. later (fin. v. 11), cicero 
has Piso, a Peripatetic of a certain stripe and one with whom he shares much, 
report that both Aristotle and Theophrastus have taught a model statesmanship 
and have written even more extensively on the best regime (qui esset optimus rei 
publicae status).28 
in the 50s when cicero wrote his first philosophical works which consist in 
his De Re Publica, De Legibus, and his major work on rhetoric, De Oratore, Aristotle 
seems much on his mind as already indicated in the october 54 letter. his works 
of this period are all dialogues, and his correspondence shows him consciously 
wrestling with Aristotle’s precedents as a writer of dialogues – following them at 
times and quite aware of what he is doing when he does not do so.29 These pas-
26  Fin. iv. 5. Annas (1995, 81) is so assured that this statement is that of Antiochus that she 
quotes it and attributes it to him without any mention that cicero presents himself as making 
the statement.
27  When cicero comes to listing his rhetorical writings in the catalogue of his philosophical 
writings in Div. (ii. 4), he mentions Aristotle and Theophrastus, and no others, as providing 
precedents for his joining here the precepts of rhetoric with philosophy. schofield (1999, 744) 
has listed the evidence we have of the extensive writing on politics in the Peripatetic school.
28  here cicero through Piso enters into an apparent difference between Aristotle and The-
ophrastus with the latter seen to attend more to the dynamics of change related to regimes 
including the best one; such dynamics appear to be reflected in cicero’s earlier work, De Re 
Publica.
29  Ep. Att. iv. 16 (July, 54); Epistulae ad Familiares (Ep. Fam.) i. 9. 23 (dec., 54) and the later 
letter Ep. Att. xiii. 19 (June, 45). in the July, 54, letter to Atticus, cicero claims, as he works on 
Rep., that he is following Aristotle’s model in his exoteric books (apparently Aristotle’s now 
lost dialogues) by writing a prooemium to each book of the work. The letter to Atticus and the 
variety of dialogue and other forms utilized by cicero all along make unlikely the conjecture 
of rawson (1975, 233) that he lost interest in the dialogue form in his last writings. rather, 
cicero is better seen throughout his writings as a highly conscious adapter of established 
forms (primarily the Platonic and Aristotelian dialogues) to his specific rhetorical objective in 
the work at hand.
Aristotle’s dialogues appear to have been a major influence in cicero’s shaping of his own 
dialogue form. J. s. reid (1885, 25) writes of the “later Greek type” of dialogue which is ap-
parently the Aristotelian dialogue and possibly that of a contemporary of Aristotle, heraclides, 
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sages provide evidence that at least some of Aristotle’s lost dialogues were very 
much before him as he launched his efforts as a philosophical writer and did it 
on the topics of the polity, the laws and the orator. cicero has then turned both 
to the writings of Aristotle, the old and possibly the new, and the writings of 
other Peripatetics, most notably Theophrastus. These are not just some sources 
among many he employs; they are materials of distinctive importance for one 
concerned with the practical topics at the forefront of cicero’s philosophical 
agenda. it is possible, of course, that Aristotle and the Peripatetics helped shape 
that agenda, that practical focus, rather than simply serving as good and ample 
material at hand and to the point.
cicero’s AssessMenT of ArisToTle And his school
not only have the writings of Aristotle and other Peripatetics loomed large and 
significant among cicero’s sources, but they were also, as one might expect, 
very much in harmony with his own thinking. recall our initial epigraph where 
cicero is found writing that his philosophical writings differ “very little from 
Peripatetic teachings”,30 an observation reinforced later in the De Officiis where 
he indicates that his school of philosophy is very close (finitima) to the Peripatet-
ics.31 shortly before this comment cicero has unambiguously identified his own 
philosophical school as that of the new Academy characterized by a commit-
ment to challenging and testing all positions and by a qualified skepticism, and 
thus capable of embracing Peripatetic teachings as well as those of other schools 
on any substantive philosophical questions.32 cicero in other words understands 
himself as a Peripatetic follower to the degree that this school seems to teach the 
truth. As W. W. how (1930, 27) states it, “it remains clear that cicero, though he 
makes good use of the Peripatetics, is no slavish disciple of the school”.
who is mentioned several times in cicero’s correspondence. in an earlier letter (Fam..1.9.23), 
written as he completed De Oratore, (De Or.), cicero says that he has written this work ac-
cording to the way of Aristotle (Aristoteleus mos) – meaning here, i believe, that he uses longer 
speeches, for he himself is not cast as a participant in this dialogue. see Jaeger’s precise and 
discerning statement on the three Aristotelian precedents as to dialogue form that surface 
in cicero’s correspondence; 1948, 29–30, n. 2. how we miss Aristotle’s dialogues! it appears 
that the Aristotle cicero knew was notably more eloquent than the Aristotle we now have. 
see Gorman (2005) to consider more fully how socratic method might be seen to impact on 
cicero’s dialogues and thus merge with Aristotelian influences.
30  De Officiis (Off.). i. 2.
31  Off. ii. 8; he does not actually use the term “Peripatetics” which he often employs but 
here he writes literally of the school of cratippus, his son’s Peripatetic teacher in Athens; the 
philosophy or school of cratippus is called antiquissima nobilissimaque.
32  Tarrant (1985) overall and specifically at 107 highlights the high comfort level of Aca-
demics and cicero himself with a Peripatetic epistemology. long (1981, 98 & passim) has 
brought out how Aristotle grasps the issues that propel Greek skepticism which arises more 
widely and systematically after him.
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That one might even think of cicero as a disciple of Aristotle and a Peripatetic 
is made even more credible by the great esteem in which he holds Aristotle. for 
cicero, Aristotle is at the peak in any ranking of philosophers. his overall view 
of Aristotle is captured in his description of Aristotle as “a man marked by the 
greatest genius, knowledge and fertility of mind and speech” (vir summo ingenio, 
scientia, copia).33 At another point, Fin. i. 7, Plato and Aristotle are described by 
cicero as “those divine geniuses” (divina illa ingenia). Aristotle may be at the 
peak among philosophers, but when it comes to a comparison, cicero’s view is 
clear: Plato is the peak. Thus, for example, only a little later in Tusculanae Dis-
putationes from that point where cicero has spoken of Aristotle as marked with 
summo ingenio, he returns to describe Aristotle as first among thinkers except for 
Plato, in brilliance (ingenio) and thoroughness (diligentia).34 on the one occasion 
when cicero speaks of Aristotle as simply beyond compare, he uses the words 
“fine or sharp” (acutus) and “elegant or polished” (politus) to describe the ways 
in which Aristotle is superior.35 in this instance where the context is a discussion 
of logic, cicero seems to be pointing toward Aristotle’s achievement in the Orga-
non and possibly to his more explicit (compared with Plato) embrace of rhetoric. 
When we find cicero recommending an overall philosophical model (Ac. i. 10), 
a task closely related to if not entailed in his major mission to introduce Greek 
philosophy to rome, it is to Plato and Aristotle as well as Theophrastus to which 
he turns. 
That recommendation says much about cicero’s understanding of his own 
philosophical lineage, specifically with how he locates himself in one line of 
descent from Plato, the prince of all philosophers. expanded versions of this 
philosophical lineage are given at times. The most significant expansions are 
backward from Plato and forward, in a sense, from Theophrastus. Backward it 
is expanded to socrates; recall again our epigraph from the De Officiis where 
cicero was found saying that his agreement with the Peripatetics was substan-
tial because both he and they were seeking to follow “the socratic and Platonic 
tradition”. in a preface to one version of the Academica (Ac. i. 3), cicero describes 
his mission in writing as an effort “to elucidate in latin letters that old phi-
losophy stemming from socrates” (philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam 
Latinis litteris illustrare). Then in Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc. iv. 6), also in a 
33  Tusc. i. 7; Orator (Orat.)5, 172; also Div. i. 53 where cicero’s brother Quintus is made to 
speak comparable praise of Aristotle.
34  Tusc. i. 22. At Fin. v. 7, Piso is made to describe Aristotle as the chief (princeps) of the 
Peripatetics and the one who is, except for Plato, princeps philosophorum. for a fuller discus-
sion of cicero’s assessment of Plato and specifically with respect to the work and achieve-
ment of socrates, see nicgorski, 1991b.
35  Academica (Ac.) ii. 143.
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context where he is discussing his mission as writer, cicero speaks of the need 
to give latin expression to “that true and choice philosophy which developed 
from socrates and now has come to abide in the Peripatetic school” (illius ve-
rae elegantisque philosophiae, quae ducta a Socrate in Peripateticis adhuc permansit). 
Though in cicero’s view the socratic torch has passed to the Peripatetics, he 
adds at once a couple of complicating dimensions to that picture, by noting 
that the stoics are saying, in a different manner, essentially the same thing as 
the Peripatetics and that the Academics are on hand to adjudicate the disputes 
of these two schools. While cicero appears in that very sentence to be describ-
ing the then current philosophical situation, the larger context for the passage 
and what cicero has said elsewhere allow us to see this statement as self-
revealing on how he stands with respect to the philosophical schools. Again as 
to substance, cicero appears to understand himself as a Peripatetic who from 
his methodological commitment to the new Academy finds the true legacy 
of socrates here, though he is attracted to at least one stoic formulation and 
the school’s rigorous consistency regarding this matter. More exploration of 
this limited attraction to the stoics and of cicero’s effort to purify the socratic 
legacy through his allegiance to the new Academy will follow shortly when 
this essay turns to consider in what ways cicero differentiates himself from or 
criticizes the Peripatetic school. 
There were developments in the Peripatetic school simultaneous with and 
after the life of Theophrastus that seemed to play a part in cicero’s attraction 
to that school. These are developments reflected in the writings and actions 
of dicaearchus, a contemporary of Theophrastus with whom he disputed on 
some matters, and demetrius of Phalerum, a student of Theophrastus and a 
highly regarded orator who came to political leadership in Athens in the late 
fourth century. dicaearchus and demetrius give a yet more practical turn to the 
Peripatetic tradition. That cicero associates himself with these developments 
is clear in a couple of other statements of his philosophical lineage. in the De 
Legibus (iii. 13–14) as he is about to take up quite specific constitutional provi-
sions for magistrates, cicero observes that, over against the stoic tradition, that 
part of the Platonic tradition which develops through Aristotle and Theophras-
tus engages, like himself, in discussions of the polity (de re publica) intended to 
be useful or applicable. he then adds that it is to this strain in the tradition he 
will turn for much of his material. After naming Theophrastus in this strain he 
adds dicaearchus, “also taught by Aristotle and in no way lacking in this science 
(huic rationi) and inquiry (studio)”. Then he mentions demetrius as a follower of 
Theophrastus and a man distinguished as a philosophical statesman. The words 
cicero uses here have suggested to more than one commentator that demetrius 
is a model for cicero himself. demetrius is described as one who “has done 
the quite extraordinary thing of drawing learning out from its shaded scholarly 
retreat, not only into the sunlight and dust but even into the very frontlines of 
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political contention”.36 Another self-reflection on his philosophical lineage oc-
curs, it appears, when cicero praises Panaetius (Fin. iv. 78–80), a man whose 
writing was especially formative for his approach to ethics in the De Officiis and 
one whose impact on the De Re Publica is strongly suggested in that very text, 
(Rep. i. 34). Panaetius is being praised for criticizing certain harsh stoic teachings 
and their complex, thorny discourse, and cicero approvingly notes that Pana-
etius had always on his tongue those same philosophers whom cicero recom-
mends for careful study, namely, Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and 
dicaearchus.
regarding the impact of dicaearchus and demetrius on him, cicero’s corre-
spondence and other writings provide additional evidence, especially significant 
evidence in the case of dicaearchus. demetrius is praised as a very learned man 
who is also very adept in public affairs and skilled as an orator.37 There is but a 
whiff of criticism of him, that centering on his overly restrained, too academic 
style of oratory.38 regarding dicaearchus, cicero’s correspondence reveals his 
reading works of dicaearchus as well as of Theophrastus before and during his 
writing of his major political and rhetorical writings of the 50s. in december of 
60, cicero writes Atticus about his reading of dicaearchus, calling him a “great” 
and “extraordinary” man; writing from outside rome, cicero claims to have a 
large pile of the writings of dicaearchus with him at the time and makes specific 
mention of possessing, in rome, dicaearchan treatises on the constitutions of 
corinth and Athens.39 There are indications that dicaearchus, in opposition to 
Theophrastus’s more traditional Aristotelian view, developed a position that el-
evated the life of political action and statesmanship to a higher status than that 
of inquiry and contemplation, and it appears that in this respect the thought of 
dicaearchus was especially formative for cicero’s De Re Publica.40 late in cic-
ero’s life in 45, well into that intense florescence of philosophical writing that 
marked the last three years of his life, cicero is very interested in dicaearchus, 
calling for or recalling certain of his works, and reading them as he plans com-
parable writings of his own.41 Yet as always, cicero is no “slavish” follower: he 
36  for another notable similarity to cicero, see Fin. v. 54 where cicero has Piso describe 
how demetrius turned his banishment from politics to writing certain notable works that 
provided cultivation of the soul (animi) and nourishment in humanity (humanitatis).
37  Leg. ii. 66; Pro Rabirio Postumo 23; Off. ii. 60; Rep. ii. 2; Orat. 92; De Oratore (De Or.) ii. 95; 
Ep. Fam. xvi. 22. 2.
38  Brutus 37; Off. i. 3. At Orat. 62 and 127 this criticism is also directed at the style of Aris-
totle and Theophrastus and the entire Peripatetic school. This is done in a context of overall 
praise for their rhetorical and stylistic excellence.
39  Ep. Att. ii. 2. see also the strong praise for dicaearchus in Ep. Att. ii. 12.
40  Ep. Att. ii. 16 is especially significant in revealing cicero’s own struggle with this ques-
tion prior to writing De Re Publica. see also, Ep. Att. vi. 2; vii. 3; Jaeger, 1948, Appendix ii.
41  Ep. Att. xiii. 31, 32 & 33. in these letters as well as the De Off. (ii. 16), cicero mentions 
four different works of dicaearchus including one concerning the mixed constitution. At least 
some of the work of dicaearchus seems to have been in dialogue-form; see Tusc. i. 21.
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is, most notably, not in accord with dicaearchus in his arguments against per-
sonal immortality, but cicero does show himself aware of and draws attention 
to this position of the man he so admires and from whom he seems to be con-
tinually learning, at least over the last twenty years of his life.42 cicero locates 
himself then in the socratic-Platonic tradition as it develops from Aristotle to 
that especially practical thinker, dicaearchus, and to the philosopher-statesman, 
demetrius. he is a Peripatetic, if anything, though a critical one in the socratic 
sense and a practical one in the dicaearchan sense.
There are two aspects of cicero’s self-revealed philosophical lineage that 
merit some additional comment here, for they seem significant to understanding 
cicero’s thought and classical political philosophy before him. These aspects are 
first the essential unity he finds (in fact, stresses) between the Platonic Acad-
emy and Aristotle/Theophrastus, and second, his interest in certain differences 
within the Peripatetic school. regarding the unity between the first Academy 
and the old Peripatetics, cicero indicates at De Legibus i. 38 that the break from 
the Academy by Aristotle and Theophrastus entailed no difference in the con-
tent (re) of their teaching and only a slight difference in their manner of teaching 
(genere docendi paulum differentis). This statement is made in a context of discuss-
ing the positions of schools on the ultimate human end or the nature of happi-
ness. since the question of the ultimate end is the fundamental philosophical 
question for cicero, it would constitute the most important way philosophical 
schools could be compared, and if they do not differ on this, they might be seen 
to hardly differ at all.43 earlier, we had occasion to mention another passage 
where the fundamental agreement of Plato and the early Peripatetics was noted 
in a specific context referring to treatment of the topic of political life.44 it seems 
justifiable to conclude that all of cicero’s references to this essential unity have 
in mind politics in an Aristotelian or classical sense, that is political science as 
a moral science based on a certain understanding of what constitutes the true 
human end.45 
42  Tusc. i. 21, 24, 41, 51–52, 77
43  This statement should also be helpful in understanding what cicero goes on to say here 
as well as elsewhere (for instance, at Tusc. v. 120 where this view is associated with carneades) 
regarding the stoics, namely they only employ new words but make no essential change in 
the teaching of the Academy and the old Peripatetics. in cicero’s view, there was no good 
reason for Zeno, the stoic founder, breaking with the Peripatetic tradition (Fin. iv. 3). The 
stoics, as separated, tended in cicero’s view to be drawn to an unreasonable extremism; thus, 
over against the stoics, cicero praises the moderation of Plato and Aristotle (Ac. ii. 112–13; 
Pro Murena 63), and he welcomes, of course, the work of Panaetius as a deflection of stoicism 
back in the direction of the great tradition represented by Plato and Aristotle.
44  Above, pp. 43–44 and n. 26.
45  other passages bearing on the teaching of an essential unity are Ac. ii. 15; Off. i. 6; iii. 11, 
35; Tusc. v. 87, 120. cicero’s conviction about this essential unity and his understanding of 
its nature can be seen to support an interpretation of his Rep. based on evidence internal to 
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cicero is aware of at least one, and that being often seen by others as the most 
important, of the differences Aristotle seems to have with his teacher Plato. in 
the Academica (i. 33–34) he portrays Varro, whom he very much respects and 
whom he intends to honor by giving him this role in the dialogue, commenting 
upon Aristotle’s “undermining of the forms” which had such an integral part in 
Plato’s teaching. immediately after this comment Varro adds that Theophrastus 
made “in a way a more decisive and penetrating break with the authoritative 
teaching” of the Academy (vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem vet-
eris disciplinae). This more important breach wrought by Theophrastus concerns 
his coming to understand human happiness as requiring something more than 
virtue alone. shortly we will see that this development in the thought of Theo-
phrastus, which cicero does not take to be involved in the initial Peripatetic 
break from Plato by Aristotle, concerns cicero deeply; it is, after all, a matter of 
the ultimate end. The Platonic theory of forms, hardly attended to by cicero 
beyond this passage, does not seem to put so much at stake as does a shift in 
understanding between socrates/Plato and Theophrastus on the ingredients of 
human happiness. 
for cicero, the socratic/Platonic tradition that comes via Aristotle does not 
turn out to be homogeneous on the very questions central to cicero’s practical 
philosophical interests. Two differences within the Peripatetic school are espe-
cially reflected in key thematic issues of cicero’s own philosophical work. These 
have both already been noted, the first being dicaearchus’s elevation of the ac-
tive political life in opposition to Theophrastus’s more traditional Peripatetic 
defense of the superiority of the philosophical life and of the goodness of knowl-
edge in itself. cicero’s letter to Atticus of May 59 (Ep. Att. ii. 16) coupled with 
his handling of this issue in De Re Publica and in De Officiis, his last philosophical 
work, indicate a profound and continuous struggle with this issue.46 Through 
this struggle he comes down on what is, it seems, the side of dicaearchus. 
The second issue among the Peripatetics has surfaced just above in our com-
ing upon the breach of Theophrastus over the ingredients of the ultimate end 
or human happiness. cicero sees this development resulting in a difference be-
tween Theophrastus on the one side and Aristotle as well as much of the Peri-
patetic school on the other. cicero welcomes Aristotle’s ennobling but realistic 
position on the ingredients of happiness as virtue plus well-being throughout a 
that text (see nicgorski, 1991a), that it is from Plato that he draws the basis for his criticism of 
Plato’s The Republic or of a certain reading of it.
46  lévy (2012) has recently examined the texts bearing on cicero’s life-long struggle with 
this choice. Annas (1995) in her chap. 3 and the editors in the introduction to that volume 
highlight the relevant interaction between stoicism and Aristotelianism in the lead-up to 
cicero. one might conclude that if stoicism entailed “a dilution of the strong Aristotelian 
conception of the polis and its treatment of political activity as inherent in the moral idea” 
(2), cicero’s siding with Theophrastus was a kind of Aristotelian response to some of the anti 
or apolitical aspects of stoicism. see also Annas 1996, chap. 20.
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lifetime.47 however, he sees in Theophrastus a slide in the direction of de-em-
phasizing the primacy of virtue in the understanding of the good and happiness, 
a slide toward elevating the importance of ordinary expediencies – the goods of 
body and fortune – in determining the human good.48 This issue also is power-
fully present in cicero’s philosophical writings, being especially prominent in 
the Tusculanae Disputationes and the De Finibus. ciceronian magnanimity is char-
acterized by its being wedded to the very notion that the sole good is the way of 
the right and of virtue, an emphasis not so evident in Aristotle.49
The fact that these two thematic issues, so important to cicero, had been 
or were being argued out within the Peripatetic school may seem to constitute 
even more reason for seeing cicero as within that school and taking upon him-
self a couple of its very important internal divisions. however that latter issue, 
manifested in the breach and apparent slide of Theophrastus, seems to work to 
draw cicero back in the stoic direction and outside the Peripatetic fold. To note 
this is to remind ourselves that however much he respects and associates with 
the Peripatetic tradition and its first citizen Aristotle, he does not call himself a 
Peripatetic and, as our initial epigraph indicates, he implies that his substantive 
philosophical positions, though much the same as those of the Peripatetics, are 
not entirely so. how then does he differentiate himself from Aristotle and/or the 
Peripatetics?
reading across the texts of cicero we are able to find three points of differ-
entiation, and they may help toward understanding the distinctive philosophic 
voice of cicero so close to but not identical with that of the Peripatetic tradition. 
only a brief indication of these points of self-differentiation can be offered here. 
let us take first what has just been before us, the break from the Peripatetic 
tradition by Theophrastus. cicero seems to see this as a symptom of a weak-
ness in the Peripatetic position on the human end being virtue plus some of the 
goods of body and fortune; attracted as he is by the Peripatetic formulation, he 
is concerned about its sliding to a quite ordinary utilitarian calculus. he wonders 
how much does a person need, beyond virtue, of the goods of body and fortune 
for happiness? The ambiguous and different responses to this question within 
the Peripatetic tradition leave him very uneasy, and he regularly shows himself 
attracted by the “splendor” of virtue in the socratic and stoic formulation that 
happiness and the good is found in virtue alone.50 Yet that formulation is not 
47  Fin. ii. 19; Ac. ii. 136, 139; Tusc. v. 30, 39.
48  Fin. v. 12 (Piso speaking), 74 ff.; Tusc. v. 23 ff.; 47–48, 85; Off. ii. 56; also, Annas, 1996, 
385 ff.
49  Off. i. 66–67. for a fuller comparison of Aristotle and cicero on magnanimity see fetter 
and nicgorski, 2008.
50  Off. iii. 20, 106; Tusc. i. 35; v. 1, 32–34; Fin. v. 22. in the light of such passages as some 
of the preceding, we must assume that cicero is not entirely unsympathetic with the stoic 
critique of the Peripatetics on the supreme good which he puts in the voice of Balbus in De 
Natura Deorum i. 16.
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wholly the truth for cicero.51 it is in his De Officiis, above all, that he strives to 
and seems to work out a resolution that preserves that noble and attractive view 
that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness. he does so by working ordinary 
expediences like security and property into the very notion of virtue or right 
(honestatem). here he can be seen working a Peripatetic substance into a stoic 
formulation.
A second matter on which cicero differentiates himself from the Peripatetics 
concerns the nature of their philosophical conclusions and overall goal. They 
like the stoics are seen to suffer, in cicero’s eyes, from an approach to philoso-
phy as a school with a systematic doctrine and from their ambitious explanations 
in natural philosophy.52 in fact, cicero believes that something of the heritage 
of socrates, his inquiring skepticism, was lost already in the passage of his legacy 
to Plato and Aristotle.53 Thus cicero associates most explicitly, as already noted, 
with the new Academy and the effort to reform the philosophical work of the 
schools of his time by a renewal of socratic, skeptical inquiry.54 cicero’s skepti-
cism is not a practically disabling kind but rather that associated with carneades 
which allows and encourages the determination of what appears to be true. it 
is on this Academic basis that cicero accepts the substance of the Peripatetic 
moral and political teaching.
finally cicero shows himself aware that his very model in joining together 
eloquence and wisdom, rhetoric and philosophy, the man who did so much for 
the art of rhetoric, namely Aristotle, had some hesitancy in giving his attention 
to rhetoric.55 cicero does not share this hesitancy, and in fact, took explicit is-
sue with Plato, whom he otherwise regarded so highly, because he found in 
51  Fin. v. 77; Ac. ii. 134.
52  for a discussion of the critical role of prudence in cicero and how it might differ from 
that role in Aristotle, see nicgorski, 1984.
53  Ac. i. 17 ff. (cicero has Varro speaking at this point). see also Tusc. iii. 69 where cicero 
indicates that he finds the understanding of philosophy in Aristotle and Theophrastus to be 
one of expecting philosophy to progress to complete explanation of all things.
54  Above, p. 45; Div. ii. 1. At Tusc. ii. 4–5 it is clear that cicero distinguishes the “selectiv-
ity” of his Academic approach with the drive for substantial consistency and the obstinacy 
of the other philosophical schools. one might say that philosophy in the Academic school of 
cicero, or in the socratic sense of philosophy, is paradoxically seen as distinct from the school-
approach to philosophy. see also Tusc. iv. 7; v. 33–34; Ac. ii. 114–15, 119–20; De Inventione 
(Inv.) ii. 5. see n. 32 above for a key reason why the school of Aristotle may be comparatively 
attractive to the skeptical cicero.
55  on the Aristotelian hesitancy: Off. i. 4 and, in the voice of Antonius, Aristotle is seen to 
have “despised” the technicalities of the art of rhetoric (De Or. ii. 160). on Aristotle as model 
for the unification of rhetoric and philosophy and as contributor to the art of rhetoric, see 
for example Inv. i. 7; De Or. i. 43; iii. 71–72; Tusc. i. 7. Also see above, pp. 43–44, n. 27, n. 28, 
Buckley 1970, 146–47, and Garsten 2006, 115–41. long 1995, 52ff. stresses with respect to 
Aristotle as well as to Plato that cicero seeks to identify with them by accentuating aspects 
of their writings that harmonize with his dominant rhetorical interests and the pro and con 
method of Academic skepticism.
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the Gorgias an unjustifiable depreciation of rhetoric.56 Aristotle in his contention 
with isocrates is seen as having pragmatically (in the struggle for students) and 
somewhat reluctantly turned his attention to the art of the orator,57 yet his school 
then becomes for cicero a receptive home in which to nurture the philosophi-
cal statesman/orator.58 in the texts of cicero the hesitancies of Aristotle must 
be ferreted out of a few places; the support of Aristotle and the Peripatetics for 
rhetoric and their contributions to the development of the art are frequently in 
evidence.59 if there is an underlying difference with Aristotle here and one that 
accounts for different degrees of receptivity to rhetoric’s importance, it is likely 
found in cicero’s embrace of the dicaearchan position of the superiority of the 
active political life; in that horizon, attention to rhetoric is a duty of a high order, 
not simply a necessity for the protection of philosophy.
*
how then does cicero stand on Aristotle and Aristotelians? Perhaps one could 
mount some argument that his few explicit differences with the Peripatetic 
school do provide the bases for the conflicts between his thought and Aristotle’s 
which come to be emphasized in later periods of the West. Most clearly cicero’s 
association with the reform of the schools through a renewal of socratic skepti-
cism could be related to the resistance of later ciceronians like Petrarch to a 
comprehensive and arrogant Aristotelianism. cicero’s greater esteem for and re-
ceptivity to rhetoric might be taken in one direction to see him as less a philoso-
pher and in another direction to view him as embracing more clearly a politics 
of liberty and persuasion. cicero stands, quite explicitly and with respect to his 
substantive positions in moral and political philosophy, chiefly in the Aristo-
telian line of Plato’s Academy. The traditions of opposition between Aristotle 
and cicero that later develop must not be allowed to obscure this self-confessed 
continuity between cicero and that Aristotelian line. Though a facile or false 
harmonization should never be encouraged or tolerated, the study of cicero’s 
writings benefits immensely from taking seriously the tradition of moral and 
56  De Or., in the voice of crassus or, in one case, of another character repeating his position 
back to him: i. 47, 63; iii. 60, 72, 122, 129.
57  De Or. iii. 141 as well as Tusc. i. 7.
58  De Or. iii. 3. 67.
59  There is an irony in the criticism of cicero as merely eloquent by the Aristotelians of the 
Petrarchan period (above) in the light of Aristotle’s considerable impact on cicero as a stu-
dent of rhetoric.  see long’s observations (1995, 52 ff.) with his emphasis on the tie between 
Aristotle’s emphasis on in utramque partem dicere and the carneadean skeptical tradition with 
which cicero chiefly identifies.  see the introduction to May and Wisse’s translation of De Or., 
(2001, 30 ff. and especially 39 and n. 52) for detail on Aristotle’s impact on cicero’s rhetorical 
writings and a perspective on whether cicero knew directly Aristotle’s Rhetoric as we have it 
today.  Wisse, (1989, especially 168, 174, 318), while exploring the similarities and differences 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and cicero’s De Or. further develops the case for cicero’s indebtedness 
to Aristotle in rhetorical theory.  see also runia 1989.
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political inquiry in which he professes to stand. in turn, cicero can be usefully 
read as an illuminating commentator on and extender of the practical philosophy 
of Aristotle and his school. in his distinctive way and in the context of the late 
roman republic, cicero has appropriated and represented the Aristotelian tra-
dition of practical philosophy in a number of respects: (1) in his understanding 
of the relation of ethics and politics, (2) in his conception of the nature and end 
of political life, (3) in his thinking about the relationship among rhetoric, politics 
and philosophy, (4) in his treatment of the basic virtues and friendship, of the 
mixed constitution, and of the critical role of leaders or statesmen and, in turn, of 
their education. Where there are differences from or concerns with the Aristote-
lian tradition, they help us critically appropriate that tradition better and thus be 
better prepared for adapting it to circumstances quite different from both those 
of Aristotle and those of cicero.60
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